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Abstract
Some consumers, such as householders, are unwilling to face volatile electricity prices, and perceive as unfair price differentiations
based on location. For these reasons, nodal prices in distribution networks are rarely employed. However, the increasing availability
of renewable resources in distribution grids, and emerging price-elastic behaviour, pave the way for the effective introduction of
marginal nodal pricing schemes in distribution networks. The aim of the proposed framework is to show how traditional non-flexible
consumers can coexist with flexible users in a local distribution area, where the latter pay nodal prices whereas the former are charged
a fixed price, which is derived by the underlying nodal prices. In addition, it determines how the distribution system operator should
manage the local grid by optimally determining the lines to be expanded, and the collected network tariff levied on network users,
while accounting for both congestion rent and investment costs. The proposed framework is formulated as a non-linear integer bilevel
model, which is then recast as an equivalent single optimization problem, by using integer algebra and complementarity relations.
The power flows in the distribution area are modelled by resorting to a second-order cone relaxation, whose solution is exact for
radial networks under mild assumptions. The final model results in a mixed-integer quadratically constrained program, which can be
solved with off-the-shelf solvers. Numerical test cases based on a 5-bus and a 33-bus networks are reported to show the effectiveness
of the proposed method.
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Nomenclature
Sets and Indices
L set of distribution lines
M set of possible lumpy capacity expansions for the
distribution lines
N set of distribution nodes, with N = {0, . . . , N},
where N is the total number of nodes
N+ set of all nodes except the slack bus (node zero), i.e.
N+ = N\{0}
T set of time periods
ΩDt,n set of flexible consumers at time t in node n
ΩGt,n set of generators at time t in node n
Parameters
ai,j,m conductance of the line (i, j) ∈ L
cpt,0 price of active power traded with the transmission
grid at time t
cqt,0 price of reactive power traded with the transmission
grid at time t
cupt,0 price of upward reserve at time t
cdownt,0 price of downward reserve at time t
cdt,n,k demand bid price for flexible consumers k in node n
at time t
cgt,n,k supply bid price for generators k in node n at time t
dp,maxt,n,k maximum quantity of active power demanded by
flexible consumer k in node n at time t
dp,mint,n,k minimum quantity of active power demanded by
flexible consumers k in node n at time t
dq,maxt,n,k maximum quantity of reactive power demanded by
flexible consumers k in node n at time t
dq,mint,n,k minimum quantity of reactive power demanded by
flexible consumers k in node n at time t
Dt,n fixed demand required by non-flexible consumers in
node n at time t
ei,j,m negative of the susceptance for the line (i, j) ∈ L
Fi,j,m lumpy capacity expansion m ∈M for line (i, j) ∈ L
Fmaxi,j maximum power flow leaving node i over the line
(i, j)
Fmini,j maximum power flow leaving node j over the line
(i, j)
gp,maxt,n,k maximum quantity of active power supplied by gen-
erators k in node n at time t
gp,mint,n,k minimum quantity of active power supplied by gen-
erators k in node n at time t
gq,maxt,n,k maximum quantity of reactive power supplied by
generators k in node n at time t
gq,mint,n,k minimum quantity of reactive power supplied by
generators k in node n at time t
Kvari,j,m variable cost of expansionm ∈M for the line (i, j) ∈
L
Kfixi,j,m fixed cost of expansion m ∈M for the line (i, j) ∈ L
Kop non-investment costs paid by the distribution oper-
ator during the considered time periods
Ktot total budget for investments
vmaxt,i maximum voltage magnitude in node n at time t, in
p.u.
vmint,i minimum voltage magnitude in node n at time t, in
p.u.
ψ0n sensitivity parameter accounting for the location of
node n with respect to node zero
Variables
dpt,n,k allocated active power demand for flexible consumer
k in node n at time t
dqt,n,k allocated reactive power demand for flexible con-
sumer k in node n at time t
gpt,n,k allocated active power for generator k in node n at
time t
gqt,n,k allocated reactive power for generator k in node n
at time t
pt,n active power injection in node n at time t
qt,n reactive power injection in node n at time t
rupt,n upward reserve provided in node n at time t
rdownt,n downward reserve provided in node n at time t
ui,j,m binary variable equal to one if the expansionm ∈M
is applied to line (i, j) ∈ L
W iit,i voltage magnitude squared at node i at time t
W ij,pt,i,j real component of the product ViV¯j , where Vi is the
voltage at node i and V¯j the complex voltage conju-
gate at node j
W ij,qt,i,j imaginary component of the product ViV¯j , where Vi
is the voltage at node i and V¯j the complex voltage
conjugate at node j
τ network tariff
πD fixed price charged to non-flexible consumers
πpt,n nodal price for active power
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1. Introduction
By 2050, half of all European Union citizen could produce energy from renewable energy resources, with a total electricity
generation capable to satisfy the 45% of the European energy demand [1]. This shift from fossil fuel to low-carbon emission sources
is also desirable, as it could contribute to achieve greenhouse gas-reduction targets [2]. Householders are expected to become more
aware and engaged into the energy system [3]. For example, by providing services to the electricity grid (such as reserve), and by
dynamically adapting their consumption through demand response programs and more price-sensitive behaviours [4]. However, the
deployment of such large quantity of energy at the local level will require the development of adequate market mechanisms with a
change from centralised to decentralized schemes [5], and improvements in pricing approaches to effectively reflect these dynamics
at the distribution level [6]. In addition, the current electricity network should be reconsidered, as the traditional design assumes
power flows are from large generators connected upstream at transmission level, to final consumers downstream at distribution level
[7]. By contrast, the future energy system will experience both active consumers and small local generators willing to trade energy
among themselves, and to provide services and sell electricity up to main grid [8]. Therefore, both novel market mechanisms, and
new network planning strategies must be developed in order to allow local consumers and distributed generations to be actively
engaged and empowered.
In the literature, a seminal contribute in network planning is due to Paul Joskow and Jean Tirole [9]. They present an extensive
analysis of merchant transmission investments, with a focus on real-world issues, as for example the effect of lumpiness in transmission
expansions. That is, an electricity line can be expanded only by discrete steps. Recently, the same problem in connection with the
effect network charges has been investigated in [10]. In particular, a new scheme termed ex-ante dynamic network tariff is proposed,
where the effect of network charges is explicitly accounted during a market clearing process. Greenhouse gas emission targets can
also play a leading role in shaping the future energy system. In this sense, reference [11] presents a two-stage stochastic optimization
model to determine the optimal mix of generation and transmission capacity, while incorporating environmental constraints. In
particular, two different carbon policies are considered to decarbonize electricity production. The first is based on an explicit cap
on carbon emissions, whereas the latter is modelled as a Pigouvian-tax levied upon fossil fuel generators. Along this line reference
[12] compares 36 different scenarios to evaluate policies and pathways to decarbonize the energy sector, by resorting to a least cost
optimization model for a simplified European power sector with price-inelastic demands. Uncertainty is considered in [13], where a
stochastic two-stage optimisation for transmission planning is presented. Several economic, technology, and regulatory scenarios are
considered to depict uncertain future outcomes. Some metrics such as the estimate the value of information, and the cost of ignoring
uncertainty are also reported.
A crucial problem in transmission planning is due to the full recovery of the investment costs, also termed revenue adequacy
condition. In particular, the congestion rent collected by the network operator is not sufficient to guarantee the recovery of the
fixed costs [14]. To overcome this issue, network tariffs must be introduced. Reviews of the most common network charge schemes
are reported in [15] and [16], where the postage stamp, MW-mile, incremental cost, and marginal cost methods are reviewed and
compared. Along this line, reference [17] analyses the impact of four different tariff schemes on network planning outcomes, by
resorting to a long-term transmission expansion problem, which is applied to a realistic case study based on the actual power system
in Chile.
The future energy system, where flexible consumers and small generators can dynamically adapt their consumption and generation
as prices change, requires the adoption of an efficient and responsive pricing scheme, in particular at the distribution level [7].
However, despite the clear evidence of the marginal nodal pricing as a means to guarantee allocative efficiency and welfare increase
[18], several countries still model even their wholesale electricity markets as a single-zone market (e.g. Great Britain, France,
Germany, Poland, Hungary [19]). Furthermore, to the best of the authors knowledge, nodal prices at the distribution level are not
yet implemented anywhere. This leads to a series of inefficiencies at the local level as the prices do not react to congestions by rising
their level in importing zones and lowering it in exporting zone. As a consequence, a distorted incentive to higher consumption and
lower production can be observed, which can translate in greater balancing and reinforcement costs to guarantee grid stability and
reliability [7]. Two of main reasons against the deployment of nodal prices are the granularity and the volatility of nodal prices
[20]. That is, nodal price can vary from one location to another even within a relatively small local area, and they can fluctuate
significantly from one period to another, as they reflect the actual grid congestions. For this reason, fixed prices can be preferred
by non-flexible traditional consumers [21], as they are unprepared for forecasting volatile prices or even predicting their own future
consumptions [22]. By contrast, flexible consumers and generators can benefit from time periods with favourable energy prices and
increase their revenues by exploiting their flexibility [23]. This motivates the need for new mechanisms such that nodal prices for
flexible users and fixed prices for traditional consumers could coexist effectively at the distribution level. Furthermore, to achieve
the full benefit of flexibility, the distribution network operator needs to explicitly account for the additional power flows from flexible
users when making long-term network investment decisions.
The aim of the proposed framework is to address emerging economic problems in a local distribution area related to the coexistence
of traditional consumers, flexible prosumers, and a distribution system operator (DSO) who manages the local electricity network. In
particular, the main objectives can be summarized as follows. First, we show how flexible prosumers can provide reserve to the main
grid under a nodal pricing scheme, while coexisting with traditional consumers paying fixed prices (that do not vary by location)
for their energy demand. The importance of nodal pricing relies on the efficient allocation of scarce resources including energy, line
capacity, and technical constraints [14]. In particular, marginal nodal pricing allows both the cost of congestions and the effect of
power losses in distribution lines to be internalised into the electricity prices [7]. Then, a fixed price for the traditional consumers
based on the underlying nodal prices is determined, which therefore embodies their efficiency and cost reflectiveness. In this settings,
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the DSO operates the local distribution grid, and it also has the capability to expand the network by building new lines, subject to
some fixed and variable costs. A line expansion affects the power flows by increasing the maximum power transmitted through the
line and by changing the line admittance, which in turn affects the power losses. The full recovery of the investment costs for the
DSO is guaranteed by determining an optimal network tariff levied on grid users, while accounting for the collected congestion rent
and expansion costs. The network tariff is charged to all users proportionally to their grid access capacity. The proposed framework
is structured as a non-linear integer bilevel model. The lower level problem represents a market clearing problem, where the electrical
grid is modelled by using a second-order cone relaxation, whose solution is exact for radial networks under mild conditions [24]. The
upper level problem represents an optimal long-term distribution grid planning problem, which determines the lines to be built or
expanded, and the appropriate network tariff to be collected. The bilevel model is then recast as a single, equivalent mixed-integer
quadratically constrained program (MIQCP) by resorting to complementarity relations and integer algebra, which can be solved
with off-the-shelf solvers. To summarize, the main novelties of the proposed framework are:
1. computation of the fixed price charged to inelastic consumers according to the underlying distribution nodal marginal prices,
while ensuring monetary payments are in equilibrium;
2. provision of flexibility (in terms of both active and reactive power) as reserve to the main grid, furnished by flexible consumers
and producers with price-elastic behaviour.
3. market clearing formulation for the distribution network within a long-term investment planning problem by resorting to a
bilevel model, which is then recast as an equivalent MIQCP problem;
4. determination of the optimal network tariff collected by the network operator and levied on distribution grid users, while
accounting for congestion rent and grid expansion costs, and subject to the exact modelling of the distribution power flows by
resorting to a second-order cone relaxation;
The remaining sections are structured as follows. Section 2 describes in detail the proposed bilevel framework. Section 3 describes
how the bilevel model can be recast as an equivalent MIQCP model by resorting to complementarity relations and integer algebra.
Section 4 reports four test cases base on a 5-bus network to highlight the main properties of the presented model, and a numerical
test based on a widely used 33-bus distribution network. Finally, Section 5 outlines the main conclusions.
2. The proposed framework
2.1. Distribution grids
Figure 1: Distribution network with 33 buses (or nodes), where node zero represents the local power substation (which is connected upstream with the
transmission grid), whereas the remaining nodes downstream depict the access points for local users connected to the distribution grid (e.g. householders,
flexible consumers, and generators).
Figure 1 shows an example of distribution grid. The local substation is located at node zero, and is connected upstream with the
transmission grid, whereas the remaining nodes downstream depict the access points for local users connected to the distribution
grid (e.g. householders, flexible consumers, and generators). In the proposed framework, the users of the network are classified
as flexible and non-flexible. Non-flexible users are traditional householders, who demand fixed quantities regardless of the price,
i.e. inelastic demand [25]. By contrast, flexible consumers/generators have elastic demand/supply. They bid different quantities
at different prices, and are capable to exploit their flexibility by selling upward and downward reserve capacity to the main grid.
Upward reserve is the amount of additional power that can be injected in a node, whereas downward reserve is the further amount of
power that can be withdrawn from a node. In the proposed model, upward reserve can be provided by generators using their spare
power capacity, and by flexible consumers decreasing their consumption. Similarly, downward reserve can be provided by generators
decreasing their power output, and by flexible consumers increasing their consumption.
The approach required to model power flows in distribution grids differs significantly from the one usually employed in transmission
networks. High-voltage transmission networks can be approximately described by using the so-called DC load flow method [26].
The key advantage of this approach is that power flows are represented by linear relations. It is based on three assumptions:
(i) the line resistances are negligible; (ii) the per-unit voltage magnitude in each node is one; (iii) and the voltage phase angle
differences across line ends are relatively small. These assumptions have important consequences. The first assumption implies
that power losses are completely neglected. The second one implies that reactive power flowing across lines is always zero. These
assumptions approximately hold for high-voltage transmission lines, but do not hold in distribution grids. That is, both power
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losses and reactive power must be considered in describing low and medium voltage distribution networks. This requires non-linear
modelling approaches. In the following, we consider distribution networks with a radial topology, as in Figure 1. In this case, the
power flows at distribution level can be represented by resorting to a second-order cone relaxation, which ensures the exactness of
the obtained solutions for these networks under mild technical assumptions [27, 24], which hold in all the examples and test cases
analysed in the following sections.
2.2. Bilevel model
The proposed framework is structured as a bilevel problem, which involves the optimization of two nested mathematical programs,
termed upper and lower level problems [28]. Formally, a bilevel model is defined as follows:
max
u∈U
F (u, x∗) (1a)
s.t. x∗ ∈ argmax
x∈X
f(x;u) , (1b)
where (1a) represents the upper level problem, whereas (1b) characterizes the lower level problem. The functions F and f are their
respective objective functions, and U , X are constraint sets. A key property of bilevel programming is that all the upper level decision
variables, labelled as u in (1a)-(1b), enter the lower level as fixed parameters. The variables x∗ represent the optimal solution of the
lower level problem, which depends on the upper level variables u, i.e., x∗= x∗(u). However, for ease of reading this dependence
is usually not formally expressed. Historically, bilevel programming has been extensively used in the field of game theory to model
Stackelberg games [29]. However, in power system economics bilevel programs (as well as complementary problems [30]), are not
usually used to actually build a game, but as a means of accessing dual variables [31], which are related to the electricity nodal
prices under the marginal pricing framework [32, 33].
Figure 2: Bilevel framework. The upper level model represents a long-term investment planning problem accounting for participants’ surplus, network
tariff, investment costs, and revenues from reserve provision. It optimally determines the tariff τ levied on network users, the grid expansion level ui,j,m,
and the fixed price piD paid by traditional inelastic consumers. Then, the lower level problem clears the market given the selected grid expansion ui,j,m,
while accounting for the exact power flows at distribution level. The optimal solution of the lower level problem, x∗ in (1b), encompasses the allocated
demand and generation quantities dt,n,k, gt,n,k, the power injections pt,n, and the market prices pit,n, which are used in turn by the upper level to compute
piD, and to verify the revenue adequacy condition.
Figure 2 depicts the structure of the proposed bilevel framework. The upper level problem is a long-term investment planning
problem, which accounts for participants’ surplus, network tariff, reserve provision, and grid investment costs. It determines the
unique price πD paid by non-flexible consumers (i.e. the traditional householders), the optimal network tariff τ collected by the
network operator, and the optimal grid expansion ui,j,m. Given the selected network expansion ui,j,m, which affects both the
maximum power flow over the distribution lines and their admittance, the lower level solves a market clearing problem to obtain
the optimal solution, labelled as x∗ in (1b). That is, it determines the optimal allocated quantities dt,n,k, gt,n,k, the nodal power
injections pt,n, and the nodal prices πt,n, for both active and reactive power.
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2.2.1. Upper Level
This section describes in detail the upper level problem introduced in Section 2.2, which is defined as follows.
max
τ,piD,ui,j,m
∑
t∈T
∑
n∈N+
( ∑
k∈ΩDt,n
cdt,n,kd
p
t,n,k
∗
−
∑
k∈ΩGt,n
cgt,n,kg
p
t,n,k
∗
)
−
∑
t∈T
(
cpt,0p
∗
t,0 + c
q
t,0q
∗
t,0
)
+
∑
t∈T
(
cupt,0
∑
n∈N+
ψ0nr
up
t,n
∗
+ cdownt,0
∑
n∈N+
ψ0nr
down
t,n
∗
)
− τ
∑
t∈T
∑
n∈N+
(
Dt,n +
∑
k∈ΩDt,n
dp,maxt,n,k +
∑
k∈ΩGt,n
gp,maxt,n,k
)
−
∑
(i,j)∈L
∑
m∈M
ui,j,m(K
fix
i,j,m +K
var
i,j,mFi,j,m) (2a)
s.t.
πD
∑
t∈T
∑
n∈N+
Dt,n =
∑
t∈T
∑
n∈N+
πpt,n
∗
Dt,n (2b)
−
∑
t∈T
( ∑
n∈N
πpt,n
∗
p∗t,n + c
q
t,0q
∗
t,0
)
+ τ
∑
t∈T
∑
n∈N+
(
Dt,n +
∑
k∈ΩDt,n
dp,maxt,n,k +
∑
k∈ΩGt,n
gp,maxt,n,k
)
≥
Kop +
∑
(i,j)∈L
∑
m∈M
ui,j,m(K
fix
i,j,m +K
var
i,j,mFi,j,m) (2c)
∑
(i,j)∈L
∑
m∈M
ui,j,m(K
fix
i,j,m +K
var
i,j,mFi,j,m) ≤ K
tot (2d)
∑
m∈M
ui,j,m = 1 ∀(i, j) ∈ L (2e)
ui,j,m ∈ H (2f)
ui,j,m ∈ {0, 1} , π
D ∈ R , τ ≥ 0 (2g)
The starred terms in (2) represent the optimal solution of the lower level problem, labelled as x∗ in (1). The upper level objective
function (2a) is composed by five groups of terms enclosed by parentheses, which represent in order: (i) the surplus of flexible
consumers and producers, bidding different quantities at different prices cdt,n,k and c
g
t,n,k; (ii) the revenues (costs) from selling
(buying) any excess (deficit) of active and reactive power to (from) the upstream transmission grid at substation level, i.e. at node
zero; (iii) the income from upward rupt,n and downward r
down
t,n reserve provision to the main grid, paid respectively c
up
t,0 and c
down
t,0 ,
whereas ψ0n is a scaling factor to account for the different location between the substation and the node n where the reserve is actually
injected into the distribution grid; (iv) the total network tariff levied on all grid users (non-flexible consumers, flexible consumers,
and flexible generators) connected to the local distribution grid, paid proportionally to their access capacity; (v) the fixed Kfixi,j,m and
variable Kvari,j,m investment costs to undertake the expansion m on the line (i, j) if a specific expansion is selected, i.e. if ui,j,m = 1.
Discount factors are not included for ease of reading. As described in Section 1, power lines can be augmented only by discrete
amount, i.e. lumpy expansions, and the parameter Fi,j,m represents the additional discrete line capacity increase. As a consequence,
the set M of the possible capacity expansions is a finite set. Relation (2b) defines the fixed price πD charged to all non-flexible
consumers as the average of the distribution nodal prices πpt,n, weighted by their fixed demand quantities Dt,n, over all nodes and time
periods considered. Equivalently, the fixed price πD is the price which ensures that the same total monetary amount is collected as if
the non-flexible consumers paid nodal prices. As a consequence, constraint (2b) generates implicitly a subsidy between non-flexible
consumers, where those in lower-priced zones pay more to compensate those in higher-priced zones. Constraint (2c) enforces the
revenue adequacy condition. The first terms inside the parenthesis in the left-hand side represent the merchandising surplus [14],
where the minus is due to the sign convention used to define the nodal injections as generation minus demand. The merchandising
surplus represents the difference between the payments made by consumers and the revenues collected by generators, and it is a
source of revenues for the network operator. In lossless power flow models (e.g. DC load flow), the merchandising surplus coincides
with the congestion rent [7]. Therefore, the condition (2c) ensures that the income from merchandising surplus and collected tariffs
is greater than or equal to the total investment costs paid by the network operator, where the term Kop accounts for any residual
non-investment cost. Constraint (2d) enforces an upper bound on the total monetary expenses for grid investments, where Ktot is the
total amount available for the investments. Relation (2e) ensures that for each line (i, j) only one expansion m is undertaken, with
m ∈ M = {0, . . . , 1}, where m = 0 represents the current line state (i.e. no expansion), whereas m = 1 represents the expansion of
100% of the current capacity (i.e. the line is doubled). Finally, the relation (2f) accounts for any additional constraints on investment
decisions, dictated for example by environmental concerns, policies on investments, strategies on line expansion, or limits due to
right-of-ways, where H is the abstract constraint set representing these conditions.
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2.2.2. Lower level
This section describes in detail the lower level problem sketched in Section 2.2. The purpose of this optimization program is
to solve a market clearing problem, given the grid expansion ui,j,m selected by the upper level problem, while providing reserve to
the main grid and exactly modelling the power flows at distribution level. The optimal power flows are modelled by resorting to a
second-order cone relaxation, which is exact for radial networks under mild assumptions on both line impedances and voltage limits,
that holds for all the reported test cases (see [24, 27] for a technical discussion on resistance, reactance, and voltage magnitude upper
bound requirements). The total power injected in a single node, termed apparent power st,n ∈ C is a complex number, where the
real part is termed active power pt,n ∈ R, whereas the imaginary part is termed reactive power qt,n ∈ R. That is, st,n := pt,n + iqt,n
where i is the imaginary unit. Similarly, the voltage Vt,n in each node n is a complex number. To cast the optimization problem in
the real domain, the following additional definitions are introduced:
W iit,i := Vt,iV¯t,i ∀t ∈ T , ∀i ∈ N (3)
W ijt,i,j := Vt,iV¯t,j =W
ij,p
t,i,j + iW
ij,q
t,i,j ∀t ∈ T , ∀(i, j) ∈ L (4)
W jit,j,i := Vt,j V¯t,i = W
ji,p
t,j,i + iW
ji,q
t,j,i ∀t ∈ T , ∀(i, j) ∈ L (5)
yi,j,m := ai,j,m − iei,j,m ∀(i, j) ∈ L, ∀m ∈ M (6)
where yi,j,m is the admittance of the line (i, j) as a result of the expansion m, Vt,i is the complex voltage in node i at time t, the
notation V¯t,i refers to the complex voltage conjugate, W
ii
t,i ∈ R is the voltage magnitude in node n, and W
ij,p
t,i,j ∈ R, W
ij,q
t,i,j ∈ R,
W ji,pt,j,i ∈ R, W
ji,q
t,j,i ∈ R, ai,j,m ∈ R, and ei,j,m ∈ R, are auxiliary variables introduced to remove the complex terms. Note that the
modelling approach for distribution grids, based on the second-order cone relaxation introduced in [24, 27], requires that the matrix:[
W iit,i W
ij
t,i,j
W jit,j,i W
ii
t,j
]
(7)
be positive semi-definite [34]. By Sylvester criterion [35], this condition is equivalent to requiring both W iit,i ≥ 0 (which holds by
definition), and:
W ijt,i,jW
ji
t,j,i ≤W
ii
t,iW
ii
t,j ⇐⇒ (W
ij,p
t,i,j
)2
+
(
W ij,qt,i,j
)2
+
(W iit,i −W iit,j
2
)2
≤
(W iit,i +W iit,j
2
)2
⇐⇒
∥∥∥∥∥∥
W ij,pt,i,j
W ij,qt,i,j
(W iit,i −W
ii
t,j)/2
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤
W iit,i +W
ii
t,j
2
(8)
which is a second-order cone constraint, where
W iit,i+W
ii
t,j
2 ≥ 0 as W
ii
t,(·) ≥ 0. Note that the matrix (7) is Hermitian by construction.
Considering the above definitions, and the grid expansion ui,j,m selected by the upper level (which enters the lower level as a
parameter, see Figure 2), the lower level problem introduced in Section 2.2 is defined as follows.
(dpt,n,k
∗
, gpt,n,k
∗
, p∗t,0, q
∗
t,0, r
up
t,n
∗
, rdownt,n
∗
, p∗t,n, [π
p
t,n
∗
]) =
argmax
∑
t∈T
∑
n∈N+
( ∑
k∈ΩDt,n
cdt,n,kd
p
t,n,k −
∑
k∈ΩGt,n
cgt,n,kg
p
t,n,k
)
−
∑
t∈T
cpt,0pt,0 −
∑
t∈T
cqt,0qt,0
+
∑
t∈T
(
cupt,0
∑
n∈N+
ψ0nr
up
t,n + c
down
t,0
∑
n∈N+
ψ0nr
down
t,n
)
(9a)
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s.t.
pt,n =
∑
k∈ΩGt,n
gpt,n,k −
∑
k∈ΩDt,n
dpt,n,k −Dt,n ∀t ∈ T , ∀n ∈ N
+ [πpt,n ∈ R] (9b)
qt,n =
∑
k∈ΩGt,n
gqt,n,k −
∑
k∈ΩDt,n
dqt,n,k ∀t ∈ T , ∀n ∈ N
+ [πqt,n ∈ R] (9c)
pt,n =
∑
(i,j)∈L:i=n
∑
m∈M
ui,j,m
(
W iit,iai,j,m −W
ij,p
t,i,jai,j,m +W
ij,q
t,i,jei,j,m
)
+
∑
(i,j)∈L:j=n
∑
m∈M
ui,j,m
(
W iit,jai,j,m −W
ji,p
t,j,iai,j,m +W
ji,q
t,j,iei,j,m
)
∀t ∈ T , ∀n ∈ N [λpt,n ∈ R] (9d)
qt,n =
∑
(i,j)∈L:i=n
∑
m∈M
ui,j,m
(
W iit,iei,j,m −W
ij,p
t,i,jei,j,m −W
ij,q
t,i,jai,j,m
)
+
∑
(i,j)∈L:j=n
∑
m∈M
ui,j,m
(
W iit,jei,j,m −W
ji,p
t,j,iei,j,m −W
ji,q
t,j,iai,j,m
)
∀t ∈ T , ∀n ∈ N [λqt,n ∈ R] (9e)
∑
m∈M
ui,j,m
(
W iit,iai,j,m −W
ij,p
t,i,jai,j,m +W
ij,q
t,i,jei,j,m
)
≤ Fmaxi,j +
∑
m∈M
ui,j,mFi,j,m ∀t ∈ T , ∀(i, j) ∈ L [µ
max
t,i,j ≥ 0] (9f)
∑
m∈M
ui,j,m
(
W iit,jai,j,m −W
ji,p
t,j,iai,j,m +W
ji,q
t,j,iei,j,m
)
≤ Fmini,j +
∑
m∈M
ui,j,mFi,j,m ∀t ∈ T , ∀(i, j) ∈ L [µ
max
t,i,j ≥ 0] (9g)
W iit,0 + 2
∑
(i,j)∈Pn
∑
k:i∈Pk
∑
m∈M
ui,j,m
( ai,j,m
a2i,j,m + e
2
i,j,m
pt,k +
ei,j,m
a2i,j,m + e
2
i,j,m
qt,k
)
≤ (vmaxt,n )
2 ∀t ∈ T , ∀n ∈ N+ [βt,n ≥ 0] (9h)
W iit,i ≤ (v
max
t,i )
2 ∀t ∈ T , ∀i ∈ N+ [χmaxt,n ≥ 0] (9i)
−W iit,i ≤ −(v
min
t,i )
2 ∀t ∈ T , ∀i ∈ N+ [χmint,n ≥ 0] (9j)
dpt,n,k ≤ d
p,max
t,n,k ∀t ∈ T , ∀n ∈ N
+, ∀k ∈ ΩDt,n [ϕ
d,p,max
t,n,k ≥ 0] (9k)
− dpt,n,k ≤ −d
p,min
t,n,k ∀t ∈ T , ∀n ∈ N
+, ∀k ∈ ΩDt,n [ϕ
d,p,min
t,n,k ≥ 0] (9l)
gpt,n,k ≤ g
p,max
t,n,k ∀t ∈ T , ∀n ∈ N
+, ∀k ∈ ΩGt,n [ϕ
g,p,max
t,n,k ≥ 0] (9m)
− gpt,n,k ≤ −g
p,min
t,n,k ∀t ∈ T , ∀n ∈ N
+, ∀k ∈ ΩGt,n [ϕ
g,p,min
t,n,k ≥ 0] (9n)
dqt,n,k ≤ d
q,max
t,n,k ∀t ∈ T , ∀n ∈ N
+, ∀k ∈ ΩDt,n [ϕ
d,q,max
t,n,k ≥ 0] (9o)
− dqt,n,k ≤ −d
q,min
t,n,k ∀t ∈ T , ∀n ∈ N
+, ∀k ∈ ΩDt,n [ϕ
d,q,min
t,n,k ≥ 0] (9p)
gqt,n,k ≤ g
q,max
t,n,k ∀t ∈ T , ∀n ∈ N
+, ∀k ∈ ΩGt,n [ϕ
g,q,max
t,n,k ≥ 0] (9q)
− gqt,n,k ≤ −g
q,min
t,n,k ∀t ∈ T , ∀n ∈ N
+, ∀k ∈ ΩGt,n [ϕ
g,q,min
t,n,k ≥ 0] (9r)
W ij,pt,i,j =W
ji,p
t,j,i ∀t ∈ T , ∀(i, j) ∈ L [ǫ
p
t,i,j ∈ R] (9s)
W ij,qt,i,j = −W
ji,q
t,j,i ∀t ∈ T , ∀(i, j) ∈ L [ǫ
q
t,i,j ∈ R] (9t)
rupt,n =
∑
k∈ΩGt,n
(gp,maxt,n,k − g
p
t,n,k) +
∑
k∈ΩDt,n
dpt,n,k ∀t ∈ T , ∀n ∈ N
+ [ρupt,n ∈ R] (9u)
rdownt,n =
∑
k∈ΩGt,n
gpt,n,k +
∑
k∈ΩDt,n
(dp,maxt,n,k − d
p
t,n,k) ∀t ∈ T , ∀n ∈ N
+ [ρdownt,n ∈ R] (9v)
(
W ij,pt,i,j
)2
+
(
W ij,qt,i,j
)2
+
(W iit,i −W iit,j
2
)2
≤
(W iit,i +W iit,j
2
)2
∀t ∈ T , ∀(i, j) ∈ L (9w)
The terms enclosed in squared brackets are dual variables. The lower level decision variables are dpt,n,k ∈ R, g
p
t,n,k ∈ R, d
q
t,n,k ∈ R,
gqt,n,k ∈ R, pt,n ∈ R, qt,n ∈ R, r
up
t,n ∈ R, r
down
t,n ∈ R, W
ii
t,i ∈ R, W
ij,p
t,i,j ∈ R, W
ij,q
t,i,j ∈ R, W
ji,p
t,j,i ∈ R, and W
ji,q
t,j,i ∈ R. The objective
function (9a) maximizes the consumers and producers surplus, while accounting for the revenues from upward rupt,n and downward
rdownt,n reserve provision, and considering the trades with the transmission grid at substation level. The positive (negative) active
pt,0 and reactive qt,0 power represent the flow withdrawn from (injected into) the upstream transmission grid at time t. Constraints
(9b)-(9c) define the active and reactive power injections for each node n ∈ N+. Constraints (9d)-(9e) enforce the Kirchhoff’s first
law, requiring the power injection to be equal to the sum of power inflows and outflows. Constraints (9f)-(9g) set the limits on active
power flows over each line (i, j) ∈ L, where the amount Fi,j,m represents the additional capacity introduced by the expansion ui,j,m.
Note that the expansion affects also the line admittance through the terms ai,j,m and ei,j,m. Constraint (9h)-(9j) enforce voltage
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magnitude limits, where (9h) is a technical condition to ensure the obtained optimal power flows are exact (see Lemma 2 in [24]).
Constraints (9k)-(9r) set the demand and supply lower and upper bounds for each flexible consumers and generators, for both active
and reactive power. Constraints (9s)-(9t) enforce the Hermitian property for the matrix (7). Constraints (9u)-(9v) define both the
upward and downward reserve, as described in Section 2.1. Finally, as shown in (8), the second-order cone constraint (9w) enforces
the positive semi-definite condition for matrix (7). The (auxiliary) dual variables associated with the second-order cone components
W ij,pt,i,j , W
ij,q
t,i,j , (W
ii
t,i−W
ii
t,j)/2, and −(W
ii
t,i+W
ii
t,j)/2, are η
a
t,i,j ∈ R, η
b
t,i,j ∈ R, η
c
t,i,j ∈ R, and γt,i,j ≥ 0, respectively. Note that, given
ui,j,m, the lower level problem is a second-order cone program, and therefore it is a convex optimization problem [34].
3. Resolution method
3.1. Single level problem
When a lower level problem (1b) is a convex optimization program, and satisfies at least one constraint qualification condition
(such as the Slater’s condition [34]), then it can be equivalently represented, within the bilevel model, by resorting to its first order
necessary and sufficient Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. However, the KKT complementary slackness conditions are non-
linear non-convex relations, which introduce non-linearities into the problem. To overcome this issue, a key optimization property
can be exploited. That is, the complementary slackness conditions hold if the strong duality property holds [34]. The strong duality
requires the equivalence between the objective function values of both the primal and dual problems. Therefore, as long as the
strong duality holds, a convex lower level problem (1b) can be equivalently represented within the bilevel model (1) by resorting to
its primal constraints, dual constraints, and the strong duality property, leading to a single and equivalent optimization problem, as
outlined in Figure 3.
Figure 3
The lower level problem introduced in Section 2.2.2 is a second-order cone program, and therefore a convex optimization problem.
In the following, we assume the Slater’s condition holds, which is a reasonable assumption for any well formed conic problems in real
world applications (see [36, p. 89] for a discussion on this point). Therefore, for conic programs, the (generalized) Slater’s condition
implies the strong duality property [34], which in turn implies the (generalized) complementary slackness conditions [37]. Therefore,
the bilevel framework introduced in Section 2.2 can be recast as a single and equivalent optimization program, as follows:
max
∑
t∈T
∑
n∈N+
( ∑
k∈ΩDt,n
cdt,n,kd
p
t,n,k −
∑
k∈ΩGt,n
cgt,n,kg
p
t,n,k
)
−
∑
t∈T
cpt,0pt,0 −
∑
t∈T
cqt,0qt,0
+
∑
t∈T
(
cupt,0
∑
n∈N+
ψ0nr
up
t,n + c
down
t,0
∑
n∈N+
ψ0nr
down
t,n
)
− τ
∑
t∈T
∑
n∈N+
(
Dt,n +
∑
k∈ΩDt,n
dp,maxt,n,k +
∑
k∈ΩGt,n
gp,maxt,n,k
)
−
∑
(i,j)∈L
∑
m∈M
ui,j,m(K
fix
i,j,m +K
var
i,j,mFi,j,m) (10a)
s.t.
(2b)− (2g) (10b)
(9b)− (9w) (10c)
(A.1)− (A.16) (10d)
(B.1) (10e)
where the objective function (10a) is the same as in the upper level problem (2). Constraint (10b) represents the upper level
constraints, (10c) the lower level constraints, and (10d) its dual constraints (see Appendix A). Finally, (10e) refers to the strong
duality property, reported in Appendix B. Note that in the single level problem there is no distinction between upper and lower
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level variables. Therefore, the decision variables of the single level program (10) are the decision variables of the upper level, as well
as those of the primal and dual lower level problems.
3.2. Reformulation as MIQCP
The single level problem (10) is a non-linear integer optimization problem. The main sources of non-linearities are due to the
presence of bilinear terms. In particular, there are two types of bilinear terms:
1. the product of the binary variable ui,j,m and a continuous variable, such as ui,j,mW
ii
t,i in (9f);
2. the product πpt,npt,n in (2c).
Note that the second-order cone constraints (9w) and (A.16) are convex relations, so they are not an issue. The first type of
non-linearity can be removed by using standard integer algebra. Indeed, the product ux involving the binary u and the continuous
bounded variable −M ≤ x ≤M can be equivalently replaced by introducing the auxiliary variable yux defined as follows:
−Mu ≤ yux ≤Mu (11a)
−M(1− u) ≤ x− yux ≤M(1− u) (11b)
By using (11a)-(11b) all the bilinear terms in the single level program (10) involving binary variables can be removed. A detailed
description of the introduced auxiliary variables is reported in Appendix C. In order to remove the non-linearity of the second type,
the following lemma is stated, where the proof is given in Appendix D.
Lemma 1. The following relation holds at the optimum of the lower level problem:
πpt,npt,n =
∑
k∈ΩGt,n
(ϕg,p,maxt,n,k g
p,max
t,n,k − ϕ
g,p,min
t,n,k g
p,min
t,n,k + c
up
t,0ψ
0
ng
p
t,n,k − c
down
t,0 ψ
0
ng
p
t,n,k + c
g
t,n,kg
p
t,n,k)
−
∑
k∈ΩDt,n
(−ϕd,p,maxt,n,k d
p,max
t,n,k + ϕ
d,p,min
t,n,k d
p,min
t,n,k + c
up
t,0ψ
0
nd
p
t,n,k − c
down
t,0 ψ
0
nd
p
t,n,k + c
d
t,n,kd
p
t,n,k)
− πpt,nDt,n ∀n ∈ N
+ (12)
and πt,0pt,0 = c
p
t,0pt,0 by definition.
By using Lemma 1 and the auxiliary variables (C.1)-(C.24), the single level problem (10) can be equivalently recast as a mixed-
integer quadratically constrained program, fully reported in Appendix E, which can be solved with off-the-shelf solvers.
4. Numerical results and discussion
4.1. Settings
This section reports five test cases (based on a 5-bus and a 33-bus network) obtained by using the MIQCP described in Section 3,
and fully reported in Appendix E. Unless stated otherwise, the following settings are used. The set of the line expansion is defined
as M = {0, 0.5, 1}, i.e., three different line expansions are possible, respectively of 0%, 50%, and 100% of the current capacity. In
detail, the expansion ui,j,m = 1 enforces the line expansion m ∈M on the line (i, j) ∈ L, through the following parameters:
ai,j,m = ai,j,0(1 +m) (13)
ei,j,m = ei,j,0(1 +m) (14)
Fi,j,m = mF
max
i,j (15)
Kfixi,j,m = mK
fix
i,j,1 (16)
Kvari,j,mFi,j,m = mK
var
i,j,1F
max
i,j (17)
where ai,j,0 is the line conductance and ei,j,0 the negative of the line susceptance, i.e., yi,j,0 = ai,j,0 − iei,j,0, where yi,j,0 is the
admittance before any expansion. The term Fmaxi,j is maximum power flow over the line (i, j) without expansion. The parameter
Kfixi,j,1 and K
var
i,j,1 represent the fixed and variable costs of building a full new line. Note that the investment costs are applied
proportionally to the expansion m, however the effect of economies of scale can be implemented by modifying (16)-(17) accordingly.
Voltages are expressed in per-unit, with substation voltage magnitude (slack bus) equal to one, and maximum and minimum voltage
magnitude in the remaining nodes set as vmaxt,i = 1.20 and v
min
t,i = 0.80, respectively. The parameter ψ
0
n is set to one, i.e., the reserve
provided is paid the same price regardless of the actual node n of injection into the distribution grid. For ease of exposition, we
assume a single time period, and one flexible consumer and one generator per node, i.e., T = {1}, ΩDt,n = {1}, and Ω
G
t,n = {1}.
Condition (2f) is checked ex-post. The MIQCP model has been implemented with Pyomo 5.6 [38], and solved with Cplex 12.9 [39]
on a 64-core CPU with 256 GB of RAM.
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Figure 4: 5-bus distribution grid.
4.2. 5-bus network
This paragraph reports four test cases based on the prototypical 5-bus grid depicted in Figure 4. As described in Section 2.1, the
substation is located at node zero (slack bus) and is connected upstream with the main transmission network. In these examples, for
each node n ∈ N+ with N+ = 1, 2, 3, 4, the amount of fixed power required by non-flexible consumers (e.g. group of householders)
is Dt,n = 100 kW. Furthermore, flexible consumers demand up to d
p,max
t,n,k = 100 kW in each node. Similarly, generators offer up to
gp,maxt,n,k = 100 kW in each node. Flexible demand bid price c
d
t,n,k and generation bid prices c
g
t,n,k are reported in Table 1.
Table 1: 5-bus network: demand and generation bid prices
Nodes cdt,n,k c
g
t,n,k
1 40 20
2 35 25
3 30 30
4 25 35
4.2.1. Effect of reserve provision on flexible users
The first test case on the 5-bus grid shows the effect of reserve provision on flexible consumers and generators. To focus on this
effect, no line expansion is allowed, i.e. M = 0. Active power can be traded with the transmission network at price cpt,0 = 5 £/kWh,
whereas the price for reactive power is set to zero, i.e., cqt,0 = 0 £/kWh, and F
max
i,j = 1000 kW for each line.
Table 2: 5-bus network: effect of reserve provision on flexible users
n cdt,n,k c
g
t,n,k
cupt,0 = 0 c
up
t,0 = 5
πpt,n d
p
t,n,k g
p
t,n,k π
p
t,n d
p
t,n,k g
p
t,n,k
1 40 20 30.36 100 100 30.62 100 100
2 35 25 30.54 100 100 30.80 100 100
3 30 30 30.51 0 100 31.08 100 0
4 25 35 30.67 0 0 31.24 0 0
Table 2 shows the effect of increasing the price for upward reserve provision cupt,0 from zero to 5 £/kWh. The second and third
columns report the bid price for demand cdt,n,k and generation c
g
t,n,k in each node n for ease of comparison, whereas the remaining
columns show the obtained nodal prices πpt,n, and the cleared quantities d
p
t,n,k and g
p
t,n,k for flexible consumers and generators under
the two different reserve prices. In both cases, no line is congested, and therefore the differences in nodal prices are only due to the
effect of power losses (for a detailed description of the effect of power losses see Section 4.2.3). The important point to highlight
in this example is the quantity allocated in node 3. When the upward reserve price is equal to zero, the nodal price in node 3 is
30.51 £/kWh. The demand bid price in that node (which represents how much flexible consumers are willing to pay) is 30 £/kWh.
As a consequence, the demand bid order is out-of-the-money [40], and fully rejected. The generation bid price in node 3 (which
represents the generator’s marginal cost assuming perfect competition [41, 14]) is also 30 £/kWh. In this case, the supply bid order
is in-the-money and fully executed, as it yields a profit of 0.51 £/h for each kW traded. For ease of reading, the definition of upward
reserve in (9u) is reported again here:
rupt,n =
∑
k∈ΩGt,n
(gp,maxt,n,k − g
p
t,n,k) +
∑
k∈ΩDt,n
dpt,n,k (18)
That is, upward reserve can be provided by using the spare generator capacity gp,maxt,n,k −g
p
t,n,k rising the power output, and by flexible
consumers reducing their allocated consumption dpt,n,k. Table 2 shows that when the price of upward reserve c
up
t,0 rises from zero to
5 £/kWh, the optimal allocation is to fully reject the supply order, and fully accept the demand order. In the previous case, the
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generator in node 3 makes a profit of 0.51 £/h for each kW traded. Now, by having its capacity unallocated, it can provide its
full capacity as upward reserve, which is paid 5 £/kWh, and therefore leads to a greater profit. Similarly, in the previous case the
demand bid was fully rejected, whereas now the demand order is fully executed, even though its bid of 30 £/kWh is smaller than the
(new) nodal price of 31.08 £/kWh. The reason is that flexible consumers also collect revenues from the upward reserve provision,
which is paid 5 £/kWh, leading to a surplus of 30 − 31.08 + 5 = 3.92 £/h for each kW. Note that as a consequence of the shift
in the allocated demand and generation, there is a net reduction of power supplied, which leads to an increase of the nodal prices.
However, this is not an issue for flexible consumers or generators, as they now also collect the reserve price.
Table 3: 5-bus network: effect of reserve provision on surplus and revenues
cupt,0 = 0 c
up
t,0 = 5
Surplus cons. 1410 1251
Reserve cons. 0 1500
Surplus gen. 1642 1641
Reserve gen. 0 1000
Total 3052 5392
In detail, Table 3 shows the surplus from power trades and the revenues from reserve provision, for both flexible consumers and
generators. As can be observed, despite the loss in surplus due to the increase of nodal prices, the revenues from reserve allow flexible
consumers and generators to achieve a significant welfare increase. However, the increase of nodal prices leads to an increase of the
price πD charged to non-flexible consumers, which is linked to nodal prices through (2b). In this case, it rises from 30.52 £/kWh
to 30.93 £/kWh, without being offset by reserve revenues (non-flexible consumers cannot provide reserve as their demand is fixed).
Note however that the provision of downward reserve instead of upward reserve, would lead to an opposite pattern, lowering the
price πD. This example shows how the possibility of providing reserve represents an opportunity to make profits for flexible users
in a local distribution network, and should represent a further incentive for non-flexible consumers to adopt more price-sensitive
behaviours and technology allowing them to be flexible.
4.2.2. Effect of different ratio flexible/non-flexible consumers
The second test case on the 5-bus grid shows the effect of how a different proportion of flexible and non-flexible consumers can
affect nodal prices and allocated quantities. As in the previous case, no line expansion is possible, i.e., M = {0}. Both active and
reactive power can be traded with the main transmission grid through the substation at 30 £/kWh. The maximum power flow of
the lines is set to Fmaxi,j = 300 kW. No reserve is provided. Three scenarios are compared, where:
i) Dt,n = 150 and d
p,max
t,n,k = 50;
ii) Dt,n = 100 and d
p,max
t,n,k = 100;
iii) Dt,n = 50 and d
p,max
t,n,k = 150.
Table 4: 5-bus network: effect of different proportion flexible/non-flexible consumers on prices
Case (i)
Dt,n = 150, d
p,max
t,n,k = 50
Case (ii)
Dt,n = 100, d
p,max
t,n,k = 100
Case (iii)
Dt,n = 50, d
p,max
t,n,k = 150
πpt,1 34.63 34.21 30.63
πpt,2 35.00 34.61 31.00
πpt,3 34.98 34.53 30.63
πpt,4 35.23 35.00 30.87
πD 34.96 34.59 30.78
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Table 5: 5-bus network: effect of different proportion flexible/non-flexible consumers on allocated quantities
Node
n
Case (i)
Dt,n = 150, d
p,max
t,n,k = 50
Case (ii)
Dt,n = 100, d
p,max
t,n,k = 100
Case (iii)
Dt,n = 50, d
p,max
t,n,k = 150
Dt,n d
p
t,n,k g
p
t,n,k Dt,n d
p
t,n,k g
p
t,n,k Dt,n d
p
t,n,k g
p
t,n,k
1 150 50 100 100 100 100 50 150 100
2 150 43 100 100 100 100 50 150 100
3 150 0 100 100 0 100 50 0 100
4 150 0 100 100 0 7 50 0 0
Tot. 600 93 400 400 200 307 200 300 300
For the three cases analysed, Table 4 reports in the first four rows the nodal prices πpt,n for each node, whereas the last row
shows the fixed price πD levied on non-flexible consumers. Table 5 shows the demanded quantities for non-flexible consumers Dt,n,
the allocated demand dpt,n,k of flexible consumers, and the cleared generation g
p
t,n,k for each node (in the first four rows), and the
total sum for the whole grid in the last row. As can be observed from Table 4, the increase of flexible consumption has a significant
effect on prices. In particular, note how the increase of flexible demand leads to a reduction of the price πD paid by the non-flexible
consumers. This effect can be explained observing (see Table 5) that the flexible demand dpt,n,k is never executed in node 3 and
4, where the nodal prices are significantly greater than the submitted bid cdt,n,k which is 30 £/kWh and 25 £/kWh, respectively.
By contrast, non-flexible consumption must be always satisfied regardless of the price, which lead to a significant amount of power
demanded in high-priced nodes. The line between node 1 and node 0 is congested in both case (i) and case (ii), which contributes
further to explain the greater nodal prices. This test case shows that an increase in the proportion between flexible and non-flexible
consumers in a distribution network can have a positive impact in terms of lower prices. In particular, it demonstrates that it can
be beneficial also for the non-flexible consumers, i.e., the traditional householders.
4.2.3. Effect of congestions and power losses
The third test case on the 5-bus grid shows the effect of congestions and power losses on allocated quantities and prices. As in the
previous case, no line expansion is possible, i.e.,M = {0}. Active power can be traded with the transmission grid at 5 £/kWh, and
reserve provision is not considered. Here, two different scenarios are compared. In the first case, the maximum power flow capacity
of each line is Fmaxi,j = 820 kW, whereas in the second case F
max
i,j = 800 kW. That is, in the first case the maximum allowed power
flow is 2.5% greater.
Table 6: Flows with Fmaxi,j = 820 and F
max
i,j = 800
(i,j) Fmaxi,j = 820 F
max
i,j = 800
(0,1) 819.60 800.00
(1,2) 201.18 201.18
(1,3) 405.14 405.14
(3,4) 201.11 201.10
Table 6 shows the flow of active power from node i to node j over the line (i, j). In the first case, the power flow over the line
(0, 1) is 819.60 kW. Therefore, in the second case, when Fmaxi,j is reduced to 800 kW the line results congested.
Table 7: Prices and allocated quantities
n
Fmaxi,j = 820 F
max
i,j = 800
πpt,n Dt,n d
p
t,n,k g
p
t,n,k π
p
t,n Dt,n d
p
t,n,k g
p
t,n,k
1 5.17 100 100 0 20.00 100 100 18.97
2 5.23 100 100 0 20.24 100 100 0
3 5.27 100 100 0 20.41 100 100 0
4 5.33 100 100 0 20.63 100 100 0
Table 7 shows the nodal prices πpt,n, the requested non-flexible demand Dt,n, the allocated flexible demand d
p
t,n,k, and the supplied
generation gpt,n,k for both the considered cases. As can be observed, in the first case no generator is dispatched. The whole local
demand is satisfied by importing power from the upstream transmission grid at the cheaper price of cpt,0 = 5 £/kWh. The main
grid acts therefore as marginal unit [14], setting the price at the importing node zero as πt,0 = 5 £/kWh. Note that, the nodal
prices πpt,n in the remaining nodes are greater than this price, despite no congestion is present in the whole grid. This is due to the
effect of power losses, which introduce a loss price component into the nodal prices [42], similarly to the shadow price of congestion
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when a line is congested [7]. In the second case, the total demand satisfied is again 800 kW. We recall that in this case the line
(0, 1) is congested, and only 800 kW can be imported from the main transmission network. In principle, the imported power is
exactly equal to the demanded quantity, therefore, no generators should be dispatched. However, the optimal solution shows that
the generator in node one has to produce 18.97 kW. The reason is again due to the power losses. In this second case, the (active)
power loss, given by
∑
n pt,n∀n ∈ N , is equal to 18.97 kW. Therefore, the generator in node one is dispatched with only the purpose
of covering power losses within the local distribution area, which accounts for nearly 2.5% of the total demand. A further important
consequence is that the generator in node one becomes the marginal generator. Therefore, its marginal generation cost cgt,1,k sets the
nodal price in that node (i.e. πpt,1 = c
g
t,1,k = 20 £/kWh), which affects all the remaining nodes. As a result, the fixed price π
D paid
by non-flexible consumers rises from 5.25 £/kWh to 20.32 £/kWh. This example shows how a small change in the line capacity can
have a significant impact on the distribution nodal prices, with non-negligible effects for both flexible and non-flexible consumers.
It also shows how a relative small amount of power such as losses, could trigger expensive generation in constrained network, with
a considerable impact on prices.
4.2.4. Effect of investment decisions
The fourth test case on the 5-bus grid shows the effect of investment decisions on prices and network tariff. In this example,
the generation gp,maxt,n,k is set to zero, whereas all the other settings are same as in Section 4.2.3, with maximum flow capacity
Fmaxi,j = 800 kW. The investment cost parameters are K
fix
i,j,1 = 100 £/h, K
var
i,j,1 = 0.1 £/kWh, K
op = 0 £/h, and Ktot = 10000 £/h.
From the previous test case reported in Section 4.2.3, under this settings the only congestion is on the line (0, 1). Therefore, here
two expansion sets M1 and M2 are compared. In the first set, the possible expansions areM1 = {0, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 1}, i.e., all the
network lines can be expanded with step increment equal to 25% of their current capacity. In the second set, the possible expansion
are M2 = {0, 0.50, 1}.
Table 8: Merchandising surplus, total network tariff, fixed and variable investment costs, and profit
M1 M2
M. Surplus 88 78
Tot. tariff 0 12
Fixed costs 25 50
Var. costs 20 40
Profit 43 0
As expected, the optimal solution shows that in both cases the line (0, 1) is expanded, with expansion m = 0.25 in the first case,
and m = 0.50 in the second case. Table 8 shows the merchandising surplus and the total tariff collected by the network operator, as
well as both fixed and variable investment costs, and the resulting profit. Fixed and variable costs are determined as in (15)-(17).
The total investment cost in the first case is equal to 45 £/h, whereas the collected merchandising surplus is 88 £/h, leading to a
profit collected by the network operator equal to 43 £/h. This extra profit is due to the lumpiness of network expansions, i.e. in real
world instances, a line can only be increased by discrete amount (for an extensive discussion on this point see [9, 10]). In the second
case, the expansion of 50% leads to a total investment cost of 90 £/h. The merchandising surplus is only 78 £/h, and therefore a
tariff τ equal to 0.0144 £/kWh is charged to network users, which allows the network operator to recover the remaining amount
of 12 £/h. Note that the merchandising surplus decreases from 88 to 78. The reason is that a line expansion also has an effect on
the admittance, as modelled in (13)-(14). In particular, the line resistance decreases. As a consequence, network loss drops from
16.85 £/h to 15.02 £/h, which in turn affects nodal prices (as shown in Section 4.2.3), and therefore influences the merchandising
surplus.
Table 9: Prices and allocated quantities
n
M1 M2 Difference
πpt,n π
p
t,n
1 5.1338 5.1108 0.0230
2 5.1947 5.1710 0.0237
3 5.2383 5.2142 0.0241
4 5.2965 5.2719 0.0246
Table 9 shows the nodal prices in both cases, and their difference. As can be observed, the difference is strictly greater than the
tariff paid, which is τ = 0.0144 £/kWh. Similarly, the fixed price πD charged to non-flexible consumers decreases from 5.2158 £/kWh
to 5.1920 £/kWh, with a reduction of 0.0238 £/kWh. Therefore, despite the tariff paid, the expansion of 50% is more favourable for
both flexible and non-flexible consumers, because yields a greater reduction of prices paid. By contrast, the profit for the network
operator drops to zero. This test cases shows that a line expansion has a double effect: (i) it increases the maximum power flow
over the line, and (ii) it reduces the network losses. Furthermore, it highlights how different network planning strategies can have
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a significant impact on surplus redistribution among grid participants, and demonstrates the potential conflict of interest of the
network operator.
4.3. 33-bus network
This test case is based on the IEEE 33-bus distribution network [43], which has been introduced in Figure 1. Bid prices for
flexible consumers and generators are sampled from a normal distribution with standard deviation of 10£/kWh and mean equal
to 50£/kWh and 20£/kWh, respectively. Negative prices are set to zero. Flexible demand and generation account for half of the
non-flexible demand. Active and reactive power can be traded with the main grid at 30 £/kWh. Reserve provision is not considered.
The maximum power flow capacity of the lines is Fmaxi,j = 2000 kW. The base voltage is 12.6 kV and base apparent power is 1 kVA.
The investment cost parameters are Kfixi,j,1 = 5, 000 £/h, K
var
i,j,1 = 1 £/kWh, K
op = 0 £/h, and Ktot = 100, 000 £/h. In this test
case, an example of possible utilization of constraint (2f) is given by introducing the following requirements:
ui,j,1 ≤ uh,k,1 ∀(i, j) ∈ L, ∀(h, k) ∈ Pj (19)
That is, if a line (i, j) is expanded, then all the upstream line (h, k) ∈ Pj connected to this line up to the substation must be
expanded. In this test case, two scenarios are compared. In the first one, no expansion is allowed. In the second one, the set of the
possible expansions is M = {0, 1}, i.e. a line (and all lines upstream of it due to (19)), can be either doubled or left as they are.
Table 10: Power flows over the first four lines in the 33-bus distribution network
(i,j) M= {0} M= {0, 1}
(0,1) 2000 3513
(1,2) 1715 3047
(2,3) 1185 2000
(3,4) 1119 1868
()
Table 10 reports the power flows for the first four lines in the two scenarios. When no expansion is possible, the line (0, 1) is
congested (power flow equal to Fmaxi,j = 2000 kW). In the second case, both the line (0, 1) and (1, 2) are expanded, whereas the line
(2, 3) is now congested.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
20
30
40
50
60
70
80 No expansion
Lines (0,1), (1, 2) expanded
Node
Nodal
prices
(£/kWh)
Figure 5: Nodal prices in the 33-bus distribution grid. The solid red line depicts the nodal prices in case of no expansion. The dashed blue line represents
the nodal prices when the lines (0, 1) and (1, 2) are expanded.
Figure 5 shows the nodal prices in the two cases, where the solid red line depicts the no expansion case, whereas the dashed blue
line represents the case when both the lines (0, 1) and (1, 2) are expanded. As can be observed, the nodal prices are significantly
lower in the second case, in particular for the nodes located in the area labelled by A in Figure 6, i.e., all the nodes upstream of the
congested line (2, 3).
A B
Figure 6: 33-bus distribution grid. In the case with M = {0, 1}, the line connecting node 2 to node 3 is congested. The area labelled by A includes all the
node upstream of the congested line.
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The decrease in nodal prices has two direct consequences: (i) the allocated demand for flexible consumers rises from 81 kW to
1549 kW; (ii) fixed price πD paid by non-flexible consumers drops from 66.83 £/kWh to 37.88 £/kWh. This test case, based on the
widely used 33-bus network scheme, shows how grid expansion plans can have significant impacts on both prices paid by network
users and their electricity consumptions. Furthermore, it displays how a single congestion in a line can have a cascade effect on all
the downstream nodes in distribution networks, due to their radial topology [7].
5. Conclusion
The increasing share of flexible consumers, who are willing to pay a different price for each quantity demanded, as well as
the significant availability of renewable energy resources and distributed generation, foster the introduction of nodal prices at the
distribution level. Marginal nodal pricing is a desirable scheme as it leads to an efficient allocation of scarce resources in terms
of both energy and line capacities. The proposed framework, based on a bilevel model, aims to shed light on how a distribution
network could be managed in this context, by providing also new profit sources for its users. In particular, it shows how flexible
and non-flexible consumers can coexist, where the former pay nodal prices and the latter are charged a fixed price based on the
underlying nodal prices. Flexibility can be exploited by consumers and producers to obtain new streams of revenues by providing
reserve to the main grid. The results obtained show that the increase of flexible consumers can be also beneficial for the non-flexible
ones, as it could decrease their price paid. Moreover, an accurate planning of the distribution network is required to account for
the increased power flows. In this sense, three main aspects should be highlighted. First, small congestion within the distribution
network can have a substantial impact on prices, and this effect is amplified by the radial topology of these networks. Second, power
losses cannot be neglected. They have a non-negligible impact on prices and could trigger expensive generation in locally constrained
areas. Third, line expansions can lead to a surplus redistribution between consumers, producers and network operator, where the
lumpy nature of line capacity expansions exacerbates the network operator’s conflict of interest.
Future work will aim to provide extensive policy analyses and recommendations based on the proposed framework. Additional
lines of research include the extension of the presented model to consider upstream wholesale and ancillary service markets.
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Appendix A. Dual constraints
This section reports the dual constraints of the lower level problem described in Section 2.2.2.
πpt,n + ϕ
d,p,max
t,n,k − ϕ
d,p,min
t,n,k − ρ
up
t,n + ρ
down
t,n = c
d
t,n,k ∀t ∈ T , ∀n ∈ N
+, ∀k ∈ ΩDt,n [d
p
t,n,k ∈ R] (A.1)
πqt,n + ϕ
d,q,max
t,n,k − ϕ
d,q,min
t,n,k = 0 ∀t ∈ T , ∀n ∈ N
+, ∀k ∈ ΩDt,n [d
q
t,n,k ∈ R] (A.2)
− πpt,n + ϕ
g,p,max
t,n,k − ϕ
g,p,min
t,n,k + ρ
up
t,n − ρ
down
t,n = −c
g
t,n,k ∀t ∈ T , ∀n ∈ N
+, ∀k ∈ ΩGt,n [g
p
t,n,k ∈ R] (A.3)
− πqt,n + ϕ
g,q,max
t,n,k − ϕ
g,q,min
t,n,k = 0 ∀t ∈ T , ∀n ∈ N
+, ∀k ∈ ΩGt,n [g
q
t,n,k ∈ R] (A.4)
λpt,0 = −c
p
t,0 ∀t ∈ T [pt,0 ∈ R] (A.5)
λqt,0 = −c
q
t,0 ∀t ∈ T [qt,0 ∈ R] (A.6)
πpt,n + λ
p
t,n + 2
∑
(i,j)∈Pn
∑
k:i∈Pk
∑
m∈M
ui,j,m
ai,j,m
a2i,j,m + e
2
i,j,m
βt,k = 0 ∀t ∈ T , ∀n ∈ N
+ [pt,n ∈ R] (A.7)
πqt,n + λ
q
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(i,j)∈Pn
∑
k:i∈Pk
∑
m∈M
ui,j,m
ei,j,m
a2i,j,m + e
2
i,j,m
βt,k = 0 ∀t ∈ T , ∀n ∈ N
+ [qt,n ∈ R] (A.8)
ρupt,n = c
up
t,0ψ
0
n ∀t ∈ T , ∀n ∈ N
+ [rupt,n ∈ R] (A.9)
ρdownt,n = c
down
t,0 ψ
0
n ∀t ∈ T , ∀n ∈ N
+ [rdownt,n ∈ R] (A.10)∑
m∈M
ui,j,m
(
ai,j,mλ
p
t,i + ei,j,mλ
q
t,i − ai,j,mµ
max
t,i,j
)
+ ǫpt,i,j + η
a
t,i,j = 0 ∀t ∈ T , ∀(i, j) ∈ L [W
ij,p
t,i,j ∈ R] (A.11)
∑
m∈M
ui,j,m
(
ai,j,mλ
p
t,j + ei,j,mλ
q
t,j − ai,j,mµ
min
t,i,j
)
− ǫpt,i,j = 0 ∀t ∈ T , ∀(i, j) ∈ L [W
ji,p
t,j,i ∈ R] (A.12)
∑
m∈M
ui,j,m
(
− ei,j,mλ
p
t,i + ai,j,mλ
q
t,i + ei,j,mµ
max
t,i,j
)
+ ǫqt,i,j + η
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t,i,j = 0 ∀t ∈ T , ∀(i, j) ∈ L [W
ij,q
t,i,j ∈ R] (A.13)
∑
m∈M
ui,j,m
(
− ei,j,mλ
p
t,j + ai,j,mλ
q
t,j + ei,j,mµ
min
t,i,j
)
+ ǫqt,i,j = 0 ∀t ∈ T , ∀(i, j) ∈ L [W
ji,q
t,j,i ∈ R] (A.14)
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(ηat,i,j)
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2 + (ηct,i,j)
2 ≤ (γt,i,j)
2 ∀t ∈ T , ∀(i, j) ∈ L (A.16)
Appendix B. Strong Duality
The strong duality property requires the equivalence between the primal and dual objective function values, and is defined as
follows. ∑
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( ∑
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(B.1)
Appendix C. Auxiliary variables
This section reports the auxiliary variables used to recast the single level problem (10) as a MIQCP program.
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− (vmaxt,i )
2ui,j,m ≤ y
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2ui,j,m (C.1)
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where constraints (C.1)-(C.12) are defined ∀t ∈ T , ∀(i, j) ∈ L, ∀m ∈ M, constraints (C.13)-(C.18) are defined ∀t ∈ T , ∀(i, j) ∈ L∪L˜,
∀m ∈ M with L˜ = {(j, i) : (i, j) ∈ L}, constraints (C.19)-(C.24) are defined ∀t ∈ T , ∀(i, j) ∈ L, ∀m ∈M, ∀k ∈ N+. Moreover, M1
is set equal to 3000 £/kWh, which represents the maximum bid price currently allowed in the European wholesale markets, whereas:
M2 =
∑
k∈ΩGt,n
gp,mint,n,k −
∑
k∈ΩDt,n
dp,maxt,n,k −Dt,n (C.25)
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Appendix D. Proof of Lemma 1
By using the definition of pt,n in (9b) we have:
πpt,npt,n = π
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p
t,nDt,n (D.1)
The term πpt,ng
p
t,n,k can be rewritten as follow by using (A.3):
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The strong duality condition (B.1) ensures that all the complementary slackness conditions hold. Therefore, by using the
complementary slackness associated with the constraints (9m) and (9n) we obtain:
(gpt,n,k − g
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Therefore, by using (D.3)-(D.4), and the dual conditions (A.9)-(A.10), the following linear relation can be obtained:
πpt,ng
p
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g
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Similarly, by using (A.1), the complementary slackness condition of the constraints (9k)-(9l), and (A.9)-(A.10), the following
condition can be obtained:
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0
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p
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d
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p
t,n,k (D.6)
By substituting (D.5) and (D.6) in (D.1), the relation stated in Lemma 1 is obtained.
Appendix E. Final MIQCP model
This section reports the final mixed-integer quadratically constrained program.
max
∑
t∈T
∑
n∈N+
( ∑
k∈ΩDt,n
cdt,n,kd
p
t,n,k −
∑
k∈ΩGt,n
cgt,n,kg
p
t,n,k
)
−
∑
t∈T
cpt,0pt,0 −
∑
t∈T
cqt,0qt,0
+
∑
t∈T
(
cupt,0
∑
n∈N+
ψ0nr
up
t,n + c
down
t,0
∑
n∈N+
ψ0nr
down
t,n
)
− τ
∑
t∈T
∑
n∈N+
(
Dt,n +
∑
k∈ΩDt,n
dp,maxt,n,k +
∑
k∈ΩGt,n
gp,maxt,n,k
)
−
∑
(i,j)∈L
∑
m∈M
ui,j,m(K
fix
i,j,m +K
var
i,j,mFi,j,m) (E.1)
s.t.
(2b) (E.2)∑
t∈T
∑
n∈N+
( ∑
k∈ΩGt,n
(−ϕg,p,maxt,n,k g
p,max
t,n,k + ϕ
g,p,min
t,n,k g
p,min
t,n,k − c
up
t,0ψ
0
ng
p
t,n,k + c
down
t,0 ψ
0
ng
p
t,n,k − c
g
t,n,kg
p
t,n,k)
+
∑
k∈ΩDt,n
(−ϕd,p,maxt,n,k d
p,max
t,n,k + ϕ
d,p,min
t,n,k d
p,min
t,n,k + c
up
t,0ψ
0
nd
p
t,n,k − c
down
t,0 ψ
0
nd
p
t,n,k + c
d
t,n,kd
p
t,n,k) + π
p
t,nDt,n
)
−
∑
t∈T
cpt,0pt,0
+ τ
∑
t∈T
∑
n∈N+
(
Dt,n +
∑
k∈ΩDt,n
dp,maxt,n,k +
∑
k∈ΩGt,n
gp,maxt,n,k
)
≥ Kop +
∑
j∈M
ui,j,m(K
fix
i,j,m +K
var
i,j,mFi,j,m) (E.3)
(2d)− (2g) (E.4)
(9b)− (9b) (E.5)
(E.6)
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pt,n =
∑
(i,j)∈L:i=n
∑
m∈M
(
yw
ii,u
t,i,j,mai,j,m − y
wijp,u
t,i,j,mai,j,m + y
wijq,u
t,i,j,mei,j,m
)
+
∑
(i,j)∈L:j=n
∑
m∈M
(
yw
ii,u
t,j,i,mai,j,m −W
ji,p
t,j,iui,j,mai,j,m +W
ji,q
t,j,iui,j,mei,j,m
)
∀t ∈ T , ∀n ∈ N (E.7)
qt,n =
∑
(i,j)∈L:i=n
∑
m∈M
(
yw
ii,u
t,i,j,mei,j,m − y
wijp,u
t,i,j,mei,j,m − y
wijq,u
t,i,j,mai,j,m
)
+
∑
(i,j)∈L:j=n
∑
m∈M
(
yw
ii,u
t,j,i,mei,j,m − y
wjip,u
t,i,j,mei,j,m − y
wijq,u
t,i,j,mai,j,m
)
∀t ∈ T , ∀n ∈ N (E.8)
∑
m∈M
(
yw
ii,u
t,i,j,mai,j,m − y
wijp,u
t,i,j,mai,j,m + y
wijq,u
t,i,j,mei,j,m
)
≤ Fmaxi,j +
∑
m∈M
ui,j,mFi,j,m ∀t ∈ T , ∀(i, j) ∈ L (E.9)
∑
m∈M
(
yw
ii,u
t,j,i,mai,j,m − y
wjip,u
t,i,j,mai,j,m + y
wjiq,u
t,i,j,mei,j,m
)
≤ Fmini,j +
∑
m∈M
ui,j,mFi,j,m ∀t ∈ T , ∀(i, j) ∈ L (E.10)
W iit,0 + 2
∑
(i,j)∈Pn
∑
k:i∈Pk
∑
m∈M
(ai,j,myp,ut,i,j,m,k
a2i,j,m + e
2
i,j,m
+
ei,j,my
q,u
t,i,j,m,k
a2i,j,m + e
2
i,j,m
)
≤ (vmaxt,n )
2 ∀t ∈ T , ∀n ∈ N+ (E.11)
(9i)− (9w) (E.12)
(A.1)− (A.6) (E.13)
πpt,n + λ
p
t,n + 2
∑
(i,j)∈Pn
∑
k:i∈Pk
∑
m∈M
ai,j,my
β,u
t,i,j,m,k
a2i,j,m + e
2
i,j,m
= 0 ∀t ∈ T , ∀n ∈ N+ (E.14)
πqt,n + λ
q
t,n + 2
∑
(i,j)∈Pn
∑
k:i∈Pk
∑
m∈M
ei,j,my
β,u
t,i,j,m,k
a2i,j,m + e
2
i,j,m
= 0 ∀t ∈ T , ∀n ∈ N+ (E.15)
(A.9)− (A.10) (E.16)∑
m∈M
(
ai,j,my
λ,p,u
t,i,j,m + ei,j,my
λ,q,u
t,i,j,m − ai,j,my
µmaxt,i,j ,u
t,i,j,m
)
+ ǫpt,i,j + η
a
t,i,j = 0 ∀t ∈ T , ∀(i, j) ∈ L (E.17)
∑
m∈M
(
ai,j,my
λ,p,u
t,j,i,m + ei,j,my
λ,q,u
t,j,i,m − ai,j,my
µmint,i,j ,u
t,i,j,m
)
− ǫpt,i,j = 0 ∀t ∈ T , ∀(i, j) ∈ L (E.18)
∑
m∈M
(
− ei,j,my
λ,p,u
t,i,j,m + ai,j,my
λ,q,u
t,i,j,m + ei,j,my
µmaxt,i,j ,u
t,i,j,m
)
+ ǫqt,i,j + η
b
t,i,j = 0 ∀t ∈ T , ∀(i, j) ∈ L (E.19)
∑
m∈M
(
− ei,j,my
λ,p,u
t,j,i,m + ai,j,my
λ,q,u
t,j,i,m + ei,j,my
µmint,i,j ,u
t,i,j,m
)
+ ǫqt,i,j = 0 ∀t ∈ T , ∀(i, j) ∈ L (E.20)
∑
(i,j)∈L:i=n
( ∑
m∈M
(
− ai,j,my
λ,p,u
t,i,j,m − ei,j,my
λ,q,u
t,i,j,m + y
µmaxt,i,j ,u
t,i,j,m ai,j,m
)
+
ηct,i,j − γt,i,j
2
)
+
∑
(i,j)∈L:j=n
( ∑
m∈M
(
− ai,j,my
λ,p,u
t,j,i,m − ei,j,my
λ,q,u
t,j,i,m + y
µmint,i,j ,u
t,i,j,m ai,j,m
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−
ηct,i,j + γt,i,j
2
)
+ χmaxt,n − χ
min
t,n = 0 ∀t ∈ T , ∀n ∈ N
+ (E.21)
(A.16) (E.22)
(B.1) (E.23)
(C.1)− (C.24) (E.24)
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